ABSTRACT
Introduction: Online healthcare platform (OHP) is a new form of medical treatment that solves the problems of an unbalanced distribution of medical resources in China. Especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, OHP has greatly reduced the medical pressure of the hospital and the risk of cross-infection. Methods: Based on self-determination theory (SDT) (Ryan and Deci, 2000), privacy calculus theory (PCT) (Culnan, 1999) and perceived value theory (PVT) (Choi, 2004), this study uses evolutionary game theory to analyze behavioral strategies and their dynamic evolution in the promotion of OHP. Moreover, we conduct numerical simulations with the help of program compilation. Results: The results demonstrate that (1) both the qualification inspection of doctors and the investment in information protection influence doctors' participation in and patients' usage of OHP; (2) both the initial probabilities of doctor participation and patient usage influence the multi-game results; (3) the trend of doctors joining OHP is affected by registration cost, time cost, and reputation loss; and (4) the trend of patients using online healthcare is mainly decided by the cost. Conclusion: This study takes the Spring Rain Doctor as an example to verify the game results. To further popularize online medical treatment among patients, the platform should attach importance to the inspection of doctors and the protection of privacy information and strengthen its publicity in remote places.